A look at 2025 state-sponsored threats, exploring how actors linked to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran use vulnerabilities, identity, and trusted access paths to achieve their goals.
A look at 2025 state-sponsored threats, exploring how actors linked to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran use vulnerabilities, identity, and trusted access paths to achieve their goals.
Across the  Talos 2025 Year in Review , state-sponsored threat activity from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran all had varying motivations, such as espionage, disruption, financial gain, and geopolitical influence. But when you look at how these operations actually unfold, similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) keep appearing: access through vulnerabilities and identity, and access that remains under the radar for a considerable period of time. Here are the dominant themes from the state-sponsored section of the Talos Year in Review,  available now. China China-nexus threat activity stood out this year for both volume and efficiency, with Talos investigations increasing by nearly 75% compared to 2024. Newly disclosed vulnerabilities were exploited almost immediately (e.g., ToolShell), sometimes before patches were widely available. At the same time, long-standing, unpatched vulnerabilities in networking devices and widely used software continued to provide reliable entry points for these types of adversary. Once inside, the focus shifts to persistence. Web shells, custom backdoors, tunneling tools, and credential harvesting all support long-term access.  There’s also more overlap than ever before between state-sponsored and financially motivated activity. It is likely that in some cases, state-sponsored actors conducted operations for personal profit alongside espionage-focused missions, while in others, cybercriminals collected valuable information during an attack that could be sold to espionage-motivated actors for further exploitation, providing them dual revenue streams. Russia Russian-linked cyber activity remains closely tied to their geopolitical objectives, particularly the war in Ukraine. Many operations continue to rely on unpatched, older vulnerabilities (especially in networking devices) to gain initial access. These flaws provide a dependable way in for adversaries and support long-term intelligence gathering. Russia’s offensive cyber activity is highly correlated with developments in the larger geopolitical sphere. For example, the announcement of sanctions intended to apply pressure on Russia by both the U.S. and E.U. often corresponded with our observed levels of Russian cyber activity. Common malware families like Dark Crystal RAT (DCRAT), Remcos RAT, and Smoke Loader appeared frequently in Talos investigations on operations against Ukraine in 2025. These families aren’t exclusive to Russia-nexus threat actors, but they continue to be effective in environments where patching and visibility are inconsistent, and should therefore be high priority targets for defense and monitoring. North Korea North Korea cyber operations leaned heavily into social engineering and insider access in 2025. These operations were both for financial and espionage purposes. Campaigns like Contagious Interview (orchestrated by  Famous Chollima ) used fake recruiters from legitimate companies to soci