The democratisation of business email compromise fraud

This week, Martin tells the story of a crime he encountered and how it shows that the threat landscape is changing.

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. Last weekend, I witnessed a crime. Not a notable crime that you might read about in the press, but an unremarkable fraud attempt that nevertheless illustrates how new threat actor capabilities are emerging. I imagine that most people reading this probably field IT questions from friends, family, and your local community. I assist with the IT provision for a local community association. It’s not a wealthy, large association — just your typical volunteer-run nonprofit like many others in the region providing community services.

This weekend, the chair emailed the treasurer requesting a bank transfer. The treasurer replied asking for the recipient's details, and the chair promptly responded. The emails appeared authentic: correct names, a sum consistent with the association's regular expenditure. Yet something made the treasurer pause. The reason for the transfer felt vague, and the tone seemed slightly off. They picked up the phone to verify. The chair had no idea what they were talking about. The emails and the request were an attempted fraud by a third party.

This is a variant of the business email compromise (BEC) scam in which an attacker impersonates a trusted individual and requests a fund transfer to an account they control. The attacker relies on social engineering to trick someone with payment authority to send the money. Once received, funds typically pass through money mules or compromised personal accounts before being rapidly shuffled through multiple transfers, obscuring the trail and drastically reducing the chances of recovery. The initial email is often sent from a plausible email address.

Closely scrutinising the sender’s email address may not help, since the attack may originate from the sender’s genuine account that has previously been compromised.